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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE] STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
KAREN MARIE JOHNSON, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
C^se No. 860222-CA 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
INTRODUCTION 
The statement of facts and statement of the case are set 
forth in the Brief of Appellant at pages 1+-4. The Appellant takes 
this opportunity to reply to Respondent's J3rief. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The police officer's questioning of Ms, Johnson as to her 
name and date of birth and his further detention of her to run a 
warrants check violated the fourth amendmeint to the United States 
Constitution. Ms. Johnson was merely a passenger in a vehicle and 
the officer lacked a reasonable articulable suspicion to justify the 
detention. 
The seizure of Ms. Johnson violated ner rights under 
Article I, §14 of the Utah Constitution and the statutory 
requirements of Utah Code Ann. §77-7-15 (1953 as amended). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE DETENTION OF MS. JOHNSON VIOLATED 
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION. 
(Reply to Respondent's Point I) 
In its response/ the State does not directly address the 
ue of whether the questioning of Ms. Johnson by Officer Stroud 
the subsequent detention while he ran a warrants check amounted 
a seizure under the fourth amendment, arguing instead that the 
Leer had a reasonable, articulable suspicion on which to base a 
sntion. Respondent's Brief at 5-7. In addition to the case law 
facts establishing that a seizure under the fourth amendment 
irred, as set forth in Appellant's Opening Brief at 4-7, the 
.tional fact that the officer received information on the driver 
it and continued to detain both the driver and Ms. Johnson while 
ing for the information on Ms. Johnson indicates that a seizure 
rred (T. 18). 
The State seems to acknowledge that a reasonable 
icion was required to detain Ms. Johnson in the instant case not 
by sidestepping the seizure issue, but also by pointing out 
fl[t]he appropriate standard for investigative detentions was 
culated by the United States Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392 
1 (1968) . . . and is codified in Utah" under Utah Code Ann. 
7-15 (1982). Respondent's Brief at 6. The State then proceeds 
alance the state's interests against those of the individual 
indent's Brief at 8-9. While such balancing is an appropriate 
)ach, where the state lacks reasonable articulable facts on 
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which to base a stop, the state cannot side|step that deficit by 
arguing that it has a great interest in checking out the 
individual. Furthermore, the state's argument regarding the 
balancing of concerns does not hold up when cne specific facts of 
this case are considered. 
The state argues that "it is difficult to conceive a less 
intrusive detention" than the one in the present case. While courts 
have acknowledged a difference between intrusions into the home and 
intrusions into vehicles, this was nevertheless an intrusion which 
is protected by the fourth amendment. The statement that 
Ms. Johnson probably wanted to do nothing bther than sit in the 
vehicle (Respondent's Brief at 8) is speculation and irrelevant. An 
intrusion occurred which could have been alvoided by simply checking 
whether the vehicle was stolen rather thar seizing Ms. Johnson. 
On the government's side of the| balancing, the state 
argues that the officer's activity "promoted legitimate governmental 
concerns regarding public safety and detection of criminal activity" 
without stating what specific concerns or indications of criminal 
activity existed in this case. Respondent's Brief at 9. The state 
could make such a blanket statement in an^ case where an officer 
stopped and questioned an individual or searched an individual for 
weapons, yet the case law is clear that a reasonable articulable 
suspicion is required to detain a person. 
The state also argues as part bf its balancing that the 
officer used the "least intrusive means of pursuing the governmental 
interest." Respondent's Brief at 9. Sucji a statement is incorrect 
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tee the least intrusive means would have been to check whether the 
was stolen rather than seizing Ms. Johnson. 
Finally, without pointing to any specific facts, the 
te makes the statement that "[t]he deputy's conduct was neither 
dom or arbitrary but was based on articulable facts creating 
sonable suspicion." Respondent's Brief at 9. The officer 
nowledged on re-direct examination that he ran a warrants check 
every passenger of a vehicle he stopped (R. 21). 1 In a 
stitutional sense, such a check on every passenger is random and 
Ltrary since the officer lacks reasonable facts on which to 
;ify a detention of the passenger. 
The state attempts to justify a detention by focusing on 
safety rationale set forth in Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 
(1977). Respondent's Brief at 9. Such a safety rationale is 
plicable to this case since the officer did not ask Ms. Johnson 
et out of the car, nor did he search her for weapons. Instead, 
sked her for identification then detained her while running a 
ants check. The officer's actions did nothing to protect his 
ty in this case. Therefore, the issue of whether the Mimms 
ing regarding a driver should be extended to a passenger where 
:ior to this statement on re-direct, while being cross-examined 
sfense counsel, Officer Stroud denied that he checked every 
snger and said he checked Ms. Johnson in this case due to his 
Lcion of criminal activity. (T. 16) The inconsistent answers 
>st that perhaps the officer does precisely what the fourth 
Iment prohibits: he routinely checks all passengers where the 
>r occupants appear different from mainstream society but does 
iisturb the passengers where they appear to fit into mainstream 
>ty. 
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there are no specific facts indicating the (passenger is armed is not 
relevant to this case. 
All of the cases cited by the sdate for the proposition 
that f,[o]ther courts have extended the Mimnis ruling to allow a 
police officer to detain passengers in a routine traffic stop by 
ordering the passengers out of the vehicle1! (Respondent's Brief at 
10) are not pertinent since the officer testified that he did not 
order Ms. Johnson out of the vehicle and h^ did not search her for 
weapons; all of the cases so cited by the £tate involve the Mimms 
safety rationale which was not applicable finder the facts of this 
case. 
The cases cited by the State on page 10 of its brief are 
distinguishable as follows. In State v. Branch, 134 Misc. 2d 705, 
512 N.Y.S. 2d 642 (Sup. Ct. 1987), the Newl York Supreme Court held 
that an officer could order a passenger whjo was making furtive 
movements out of a vehicle stopped for a tjraffic matter and frisk 
him for weapons where both the driver and lanother passenger who had 
run from the vehicle were carrying guns. The Branch Court 
acknowledged that "one cannot be stopped 4r arrested for merely 
being in the company of another" (citations omitted). Branch at 
643. The Court made a distinction betweeh the ability of an officer 
to order a passenger out of a vehicle for safety reasons, and the 
constitutional ability to thereafter frislj: that person. Id. Based 
on the facts of that case and a safety rationale, the court upheld 
the frisk. 
In People v. Livigni, 88 A.D.2JJ 386, 453 N.Y.S. 2d 708 
(1982), aff'd, 58 N.Y.2d 894, 460 N.Y.S.2& 530, 447 N.E.2d 1324 
(1981), the court addressed the "narrow qbestion" of whether a 
ice officer can "order a passenger out of the vehicle at gunpoint 
ause of the officer's observation of an empty gun holster in 
in view in the passenger compartment of the vehicle." Livigni at 
As was the case in Branch, the decision that such action was 
missible was based on a safety rationale and specific facts 
icating the passenger might be armed, neither of which is present 
the instant case. 
Similarly, in People v. David L., 56 N.Y.2d 698, 451 
.S.2d 722, 436 N.E.2d 1324 (1981); cert, denied, 459 U.S. 866 
32), a gun in the waist band of the passenger was visible to the 
Leer, as the passenger moved along the seat.2 
Finally, as the state points out in its brief, People v. 
turin, 120 A.D.2d 270, 508 N.Y.S. 2d 429 (1986) involved both the 
>ty rationale for ordering the passenger out of the vehicle, and 
ific facts indicating the passenger was in fact armed, 
indent's Brief at 10-11. In the instant case, where the 
cer's actions indicated he was not concerned about weapons and 
e no specific facts linked Ms. Johnson to criminal activity (or 
suggested that the driver was involved in anything other than 
fie violations), the cases cited by the state in support of an 
nsion of the Mimms rationale are inapplicable. 
5 narrow question addressed in David L. was whether the officer 
3 open the door "during the course of an investigation" 
)wing a traffic stop. People v. David L., 439 N.Y.S. 2d 152, 
81 A.D.2d 893 (1981) . 
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The State's assertion that "if a police officer making a 
routine traffic stop is permitted to detain any passengers by 
ordering them to exit the vehicle, it certainly follows that it is 
no more intrusive for a police officer to Request that the 
passengers remain seated during the traffic! stop" (Respondent's 
Brief at 11) is not persuasive since the officer did more than ask 
Ms. Johnson to remain seated—he asked her for her name and detained 
her while running a warrants check. The safety rationale which 
permits an officer to order an individual thut of a car does not 
allow an officer to question an individual as to identity and detain 
that person during a warrants check. In addition to a safety 
rationale (which, as outlined above, does jiot apply in this case), 
the state suggests that a legitimate interest is "to solicit the 
passengers [sic] aid in identifying the d^'ver and owner of the 
vehicle and whether the driver has the ownler's permission to operate 
the vehicle." Respondent's Brief at 11—12J. While such a statement 
is questionable, in this case the officer Idid not attempt to find 
out whether the car was stolen. Nothing indicates that he asked the 
driver whose car it was or otherwise questioned her regarding 
permission to use it. The officer was simply doing what he always 
did when he felt like doing it—running a warrants check on all 
occupants of a vehicle he stopped to see whether they had 
outstanding warrants. 
In State v. Davis, 452 So.2d 1^ 08 (La. App. 5th Cir. 
1984) cited by the State in its brief at 12, the driver was arrested 
prior to questioning of the passenger. vU& Davis court pointed out 
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t where the driver is arrested, the matter ceases to be a routine 
ffic stop and legitimate reasons to question the passenger exist. 
The straightforward question in this case is whether, 
er the facts of the case, Officer Stroud had a reasonable, 
iculable suspicion which justified the detention of Ms. Johnson, 
icer Stroud attempted to justify the detention of Ms. Johnson by 
ting that he believed the car was stolen. His failure to run a 
:k on the car to see if it were stolen undermines that statement 
suggests that it was a convenient rationale to use once the 
mtion was questioned. In addition, the facts known to him 
>ly did not amount to a reasonable articulable suspicion that the 
cle was stolen or that Ms. Johnson was involved in any such 
t. 
Although the factual background is different in the 
ent case than in United States v. Luckett, 484 F.2d 89 (9th Cir. 
), Ms. Johnson cited that case in the opening brief for the 
osition that detaining an individual to run a warrants check 
ires a reasonable articulable suspicion under the fourth 
3ment. All other factors aside, the officer obtained 
rmation on the driver first then detained both while waiting for 
rmation on Ms. Johnson (T. 18). 
At the time the officer requested identification from Ms. 
jon, he knew that the brake light was broken on an older model, 
Mercury Capri (T. 6). He knew that the driver was not the 
tered owner and that there was no registration in the vehicle 
). Armed with that information, if the officer truly had a 
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suspicion that the car 
hunch that the vehicle was stolen, he should have run a check on 
whether the vehicle was reported stolen, not detained Ms. Johnson 
for a warrants check. The information knov^ n to the officer simply 
did not amount to a reasonable articulable 
was stolen or that Ms. Johnson was involved in such a theft. The 
fishing expedition for warrants by the officer violated the fourth 
amendment, and all evidence seized from Msj Johnson should have been 
suppressed. 
POINT III. 
THE DETENTION OF MS. JOHNSON 
STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. 
(Reply to Point II of Respondentfs Brief) 
The State argues that the "statutory agrument was not 
VIOLATED UTAH 
presented to the trial court and therefore 
for the first time on appeal." Respondent 
the State itself concedes in Point I of it 
codifies Terry and its progeny. Responded 
Carter, 707 P.2d 656 (Utah 1985) is distin 
Appellant in that case raised a new factual 
should not be considered 
fs Brief at 13. However, 
Is brief that the statute 
t's Brief at 6. State v. 
guishable since the 
1 argument on appeal. In 
the instant case, Ms. Johnson moved to suppress the evidence based 
on the unlawful seizure; implicit in her argument, as conceded by 
the State in its focus on the statute in Point I, is the statutory 
argument. 
In addition, while the majority opinion in State v. 
Watts, 76 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 4 (Feb. 17, 1^88) did note that the Utah 
Supreme Court has never drawn a distinction between the Article I, 
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I of the Utah Constitution and the fourth amendment of the United 
ites Constitution, such a failure does not preclude distinctions 
the future as new fact situations arise. See State v, Larocco, 
: P.2d 89, 103 (Utah App. 1987) (cert, granted January 26, 1988) 
Hings, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part) . See also 
ts, fn. 8 at 7. In addition, Justice Zimmerman in a dissenting 
nion to which Justice Durham concurred, disagreed with the 
ority in State v, Watts, that the Utah Supreme Court has 'never 
wn any distinctions'" between Article I, §14 and the federal 
rth amendment and pointed out "I do not think this dictum 
resses the views of all those joining in the Chief Justice's 
nion, much less a majority of the court" and noted that his 
ition is supported by footnote 8 of the majority opinion. Watts, 
nmerman, J. dissenting) at 7-8. Hence, Watts does not preclude 
extension of Article I, §14 beyond the protections of the federal 
:th amendment. 
CONCLUSION 
For any and all of the foregoing reasons, Ms. Johnson 
lests this Court to reverse the conviction and the trial court's 
ng on the motion to suppress and remand this case to the trial 
t with an order to suppress the evidence, and dismiss the 
ges or provide for a new trial without such evidence. 
DATED this p ^ day of April, 1988. 
^ ^ ' ^ , ^ ^ < ^ — — 4 r L ~ 
X^-DEBR^K. L O t / ' 
At torney for Appel lan t 
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